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NOTES
"IN CONNECTION WITH":
THE NEED FOR LIMITATION
TO SEC RULE 10b-5 IN DISSEMINATION OF
MISLEADING INFORMATION CASES
In recent years, securities fraud has become a recurrent topic
on the nightly news. Actions based on SEC Rule lOb-5, the pre-
eminent tool of securities law enforcement, have flooded the dock-
ets. Securities fraud is a problem not only for investors, but for
businesses as well: the stigma of securities fraud can potentially
damage the performance of a firm in both the stock and consumer
markets. There is a tension in providing adequate protection to
both investors and corporations when a securities fraud action is
brought under lOb-5. Courts have encountered lOb-5 claims in a
plethora of scenarios and the interpretation of the rule's various
elements has not always been clear-cut. One element, the "in con-
nection with" requirement, has received varied interpretation that
has led to confusion among courts, investors, and businesses as to
when fraud is within the ambit of lOb-5. This Note will examine
the "in connection with" requirement in the context of a public
misrepresentation by a corporate issuer. It will show that a broad
analysis of the requirement is necessary, but that courts should use
caution and limit actions against corporations to protect against the
stigma of securities fraud associated with frivolous lOb-5 actions.
To analyze the "in connection with" requirement, the origin of
the rule first must be addressed. With section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, Congress gave the SEC power to
promulgate rules to prohibit fraud, manipulation, or insider trad-
ing.' With that in mind, the SEC promulgated Rule lOb-5, forbid-
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000). In pertinent part, section 10(b) states:
1347
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
2ding the use of manipulative and deceptive devices. To state a
claim under SEC Rule lOb-5 a plaintiff must show "(1) fraud or
deceit (2) by any person (3) in connection with (4) the purchase or
sale (5) of any security."3 As fraud is a necessary element, the
common law elements of fraud must also be shown; that is, sci-
enter, materiality, reliance, causation, and damages must be dem-
onstrated.4
Rule lOb-5 has been around for quite some time and has come
up in a myriad of factual contexts. In some cases, the connection
between the fraud and the sale or purchase of a security has been
strained.5 Professor C. Edward Fletcher described the cases as
ranging from paradigmatic securities fraud, his category 1 case,
where one party affirmatively induces another to purchase or sell a
security, 6 to conversion of stock, his category 6 case, where a per-
son merely intends to deprive an investor of an ownership inter-
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered... any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the pub-
lic interest or for the protection of investors.
ld.
2 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2002). Rule lOb-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a mate-
rial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.
Id. (emphasis added).
3 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SEcuRrrTEs REGULATION § 12.4[2] (4th ed. 2002)
(drawing on the language of the rule). Compare Scott J. Davis, Liabilities Under Sections
10(b), 18 and 20 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES
LAWS 835, 847 (PLI Sept.-Dec. 2001) (stating that, in general, an action under lOb-5 requires a
plaintiff to prove "(1) a fraudulent or manipulative scheme or a material misrepresentation or
omission; (2) the scienter of the defendant; (3) justifiable reliance by the plaintiff; and (4) that
the wrongful conduct proximately caused the injury 'in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security."').
4 HAZEN, supra note 3, § 12.4[2].
5 See Anna Mae Maloney, Semerenko v. Cendant Corp.: The Third Circuit Clarifies the
Securities Exchange Commission's Rule lOb-5 in the Context of Public Misrepresentations, 47
VILL. L. REV. 1171, 1172 (2002) (noting that the language of Rule 1Ob-5 does not attach a fixed
and precise meaning to the "in connection with" requirement).
6 C. Edward Fletcher, I, The "In Connection With" Requirement of Rule lOb-5, 16
PEPP. L. REV. 913, 929 (1989).
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est. 7 A misrepresentation by a corporate issuer, where a corpora-
tion issues a statement that it knows to be false and on the basis of
which investors trade and lose money is his category 2 case.
8
Other factual scenarios that Fletcher illuminated include his cate-
gory 3 cases where there is a third party connection with the pur-
chase or sale of a security.9 This would be a situation that involves
an investor and a party that is neither the seller or purchaser of a
security nor a corporate issuer, but rather an accounting firm or a
broker.' 0 The category 4 cases involve corporate mismanagement,
where plaintiff shareholders try to impose lOb-5 liability against
the directors or officers of a corporation, arguing that the stock
price was affected by their mismanagement." A fifth category of
"in connection with" requirement cases involve misappropriation
of information, which is essentially insider trading.1
2
Misleading statements about public securities are troublesome
when the speaker is not actually buying or selling securities. The
Supreme Court has limited private actions under lOb-5 to actual
purchasers or sellers of securities, 3 but courts have had difficulty
determining how close the connection must be to satisfy the "in
connection with" requirement. Some courts have gone too far,
finding a sufficient connection between the fraud and the securities
transaction any time material information is disseminated into a
medium on which a reasonable investor would rely. 14 Other courts
have limited the connection too much in some contexts, requiring
the securities' underlying value to be affected.' 5 A middle ground
is required in order to appropriately capture prohibited conduct
within a public misrepresentation context.
In recent years, the federal circuits have divided on how to in-
terpret the "in connection with" requirement.16 In 2001, the United
States Supreme Court declined to review a dangerous precedent in
Id. at 958.
8 Id. at 932; see also Maloney, supra note 5, at 1180-81 (noting the difference between
private misrepresentations and public misrepresentations).
9 Fletcher, supra note 6, at 936-37.
1o Id.
I Id. at 947.
12 Id. at 954.
13 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); see also Nairobi Hold-
ings Ltd. v. Brown Bros. Harriman & Co., No. 02 Civ. 1230, 2002 WL 31027550, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2002) (stating the general rule that shareholders have no standing to sue
when they decide not to sell their shares due to an "unduly rosy representation" or a failure to
disclose adverse material) (citation omitted).
14 See Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2000).
5 See, e.g., Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1984);
Anatian v. Coutts Bank (Switzerland) Ltd., 193 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 1999).
16 See generally High Court Will Not Review Ruling In Which 'Connection' Element
Clarified, 33 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 8, 281 (Feb. 26, 2001).
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which the Third Circuit adopted an extremely broad approach 7 to
the "in connection with" requirement in the context of a public
misrepresentation by a corporate issuer. That Circuit held, in
Semerenko v. Cendant Corporation,'8 that it was unnecessary for
the Plaintiff class to establish that the defendants believed the mis-
representations would influence their investment decision. This is
dangerous because that is what really connects the misrepresenta-
tion to the investment decision.
This Note will argue that in cases involving dissemination of
misleading information, lOb-5 is best served by-and investors are
sufficiently protected by-using the "in connection with" require-
ment as a principle of limitation. That is, courts should look to the
requirement with an eye toward limiting the number of fraud cases
and, thus, protecting corporations from the stigma of securities
fraud. This Note will contend that an examination of the broad
and narrow approaches to interpretation reveals that the narrow
approach (whereby the "in connection with" requirement is satis-
fied only when the value of the security is affected) is too restric-
tive in the public misrepresentation context. In addition, this Note
will examine federal court decisions that create problems in the
interpretation of the "in connection with" requirement, and conse-
quently that Semerenko is too broad, encompassing conduct not
intended to be prohibited by Congress. To effectuate Congress's
desire that an investor not be induced into a securities transaction
by false or misleading information, the test for satisfying the "in
connection with" element must require the corporation to have had
a reasonable expectation of influencing an investment decision.
I. THE "IN CONNECTION WITH" REQUIREMENT
AS A LIMITING PRINCIPLE
Although protection of investors is of the utmost concern un-
der the securities laws, lOb-5 need not be so far reaching as to cap-
ture conduct that has a tangential connection to a securities trans-
action. Rule lOb-5 should be limited in its application to corporate
issuers, and the "in connection with" requirement is the appropri-
ate vehicle for accomplishing this. Analysis of the legislative his-
tory of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ma-
jor case law precedent, and recent trends in Congressional legisla-
tion indicate the type of activity that should be prohibited under
17 Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 176.
18 223 F.3d 165.
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10b-5. This is conduct that can be expected to influence the in-
vestment decision.
A. Legislative History of Section 10(b) of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act
In 1929, security prices escalated to exorbitant levels and, ul-
timately, the stock market crashed. In response, Congress passed
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in an attempt to prevent an-
other market failure.19 Rule lOb-5 was later drafted and adopted in
a single day to deal with a company president who was buying
shares of his company using misrepresentations. 20 Focusing on
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act is necessary because it gave the SEC
authority to promulgate Rule 1Ob-5. However, legislative history
regarding section 10(b) is sparse. 21 The only legislative history
that even suggested a broad remedial purpose was a comment
made by Thomas Corcoran, an advisor to President Roosevelt, who
simply noted that section 10(b) was a general catchall provision
22for manipulative devices. However, the "generally understood
purpose of the antifraud provisions, including section 10(b), is 'the
encouragement of desirable investment-related behavior by dimin-
ishing the fear of fraud and manipulation that might otherwise chill
such activity."' 23 It is accepted that, with 10(b), Congress sought
to "proscribe fraud, deceit, or manipulation that might compromise
either the integrity of investment decisions being made by inves-
tors, or the integrity of the market mechanisms that facilitate in-
vestment activity. '24 This suggests that protection of investors'
investment activity from manipulation was of prime importance to
Congress at the time of enactment.
19 Michael P. Catina & Cindy M. Schmitt, Note, Private Securities Litigation: The Need
For Reform, 13 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 295, 296-97 (1998); see also William S. Fein-
stein, Pleading Securities Fraud With Particularity-Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) in
the Rule 10b-5 Context: Kowal v. MCI Communications Corporation, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
851, 852 (1995) (noting that both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act were direct responses to abuses
in the securities markets that precipitated the 1929 stock market crash).
20 Fletcher, supra note 6, at 961.
21 Id.
22 Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong. 115 (1934) (statement of Mr. Thomas
Gardiner Corcoran, Counsel with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation).
23 Francesca Muratori, The Boundaries of the "In Connection With" Requirement of Rule
lOb-5: Should Advertising be Actionable as Securities Fraud?, 56 Bus. LAW. 1057, 1078
(2001) (quoting Donald C. Langevoort, Schoenbaum Revisited: Limiting the Scope of Antifraud
Protection in an Internationalized Securities Marketplace, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241,
256 (1992)).
24 Id.
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In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,25 the Supreme Court traced
the history of section 10(b) and deemed significant the following
statement by Thomas Corcoran: "The section was described rightly
as a 'catchall' clause to enable the Commission 'to deal with new
manipulative [or cunning] devices.' ' ,2 6 The Court determined that
a drafter would not use those words to impose liability for merely
negligent acts, and that negligence, therefore, should not be in-
cluded within the section 10(b) frame.27 Thus, at a minimum, cor-
porate issuers should be protected from liability for negligently
disseminating misleading information.
The Supreme Court's decision in Hochfelder also factored in
the congressional committee reports regarding section 10(b). The
reports indicated that liability would not attach absent scienter, and
led to the conclusion that Congress intended no lesser standard for
liability under section 10(b). 8 The Senate Report discussed the
abuses that gave rise to the need for the 1934 Exchange Act and
the inadequacy of self-regulation by the stock exchanges. How-
ever, the only reference to section 10 was the statement that:
In addition to the discretionary and elastic powers conferred
on the administrative authority, effective regulation must in-
clude several clear statutory provisions reinforced by penal
and civil sanctions, aimed at those manipulative and decep-
tive practices which have been demonstrated to fulfill no use-
ful function. These sanctions are found in sections 9, 10, and
16.29
As a result, the rule and its elements must be clear.
The issue of a defendant's mindset in a 1Ob-5 action has
largely been addressed by the requirement of scienter. 30 However,
it is unclear whether scienter applies simply with respect to the
fraudulent act or whether scienter is required with respect to the
actual use of the fraudulent act to manipulate an investor's deci-
2 425 US. 185 (1976).
26 Id. at 203 (quoting Thomas Corcoran, Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearings on H.R.
7852 and H.R. 8720 before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong.
115 (1934)).
27 Id.
2 Id. at 204.
29 Id. at 204-05 (quoting S. REP. No. 73-792, at 6 (1934)). It should be noted that the
Senate Report gave a summary of S. 3420, 73d Cong. (1934) by sections, and with respect to
section 10(b) it stated that it authorized the Commission to prohibit or regulate the use of "any
other manipulative or deceptive practices." S. REP. No. 73-792, at 18 (1934). False information
was included in this category earlier in the report. S. REP. No. 73-792, at 8 (1934).
30 See Davis, supra note 3, at 393 (noting that "[slince Ernst & Ernst, all circuits except
the Fourth have adopted the view that recklessness is a sufficient basis for liability under Rule
1Ob-5" with respect to scienter).
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sion.31 If it is with respect to the act, then it appears that any fraud
with a tangential connection to securities in a transaction could
result in lOb-5 liability. This is not what Congress intended. Al-
though the SEC was given "discretionary and elastic" powers,
Congress was concerned with protecting investment activity, not
with making common law fraud actionable under the securities
laws. If, however, a defendant must have scienter with respect to
manipulating an investor's decision, then there is a link between
the manipulative conduct and the investment activity. Either way,
to protect the integrity of investment activity, a connection be-
tween the fraud and the transaction itself must be required.
B. Analysis of Major Precedent in 10b-5 Cases
The "in connection with" requirement was first analyzed in
1952 in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.32 The Second Circuit
suggested that, for the requirement to be met, the deception or ma-
nipulation must be something that is "usually associated" with the
sale or purchase of a security.33 Professor Fletcher believed that
this early approach may have been an attempt both to limit the ap-
plication of lOb-5, such that it would conform with the purposes
for which it was designed, and to define the instances in which the
"in connection with" element would be satisfied.34
The next major case on the "in connection with" requirement
was SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 35  The Texas Gulf Sulphur
Company ("TGS") discovered minerals on its Canadian property. 36
Before the information was released to the public, company offi-
cials purchased shares of its stock on the open market. Addition-
ally, the board issued stock options to key management personnel
who were aware of the discovery. 37 A press release was then is-
sued to deny rumors in Canada that TGS had a major ore strike in
31 See Fletcher, supra note 6, at 919 (noting that the deception or fraud must have been
made with scienter to satisfy the fraud element); 2 HAZEN, supra note 3, § 12.4(2) (noting that
"[iln its strictest sense, scienter means intent to deceive"); see also In re Navarre Corp. Sec.
Litig., 299 F.3d 735, 742 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting that scienter means the intent to deceive, ma-
nipulate, or defraud); In re NationsMart Corp. Sec. Litig., 130 F.3d 309, 320 (8th Cir. 1997)
(same).
32 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
33 Id. at 464; see also Muratori, supra note 23, at 1059 (discussing the suggestion by the
court).
34 Fletcher, supra note 6, at 922-23; see also Comment, Private Enforcement Under Rule
10b-5: An Injunction for a Corporate Issuer?, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 618, 620 (1967) (discussing
Birnbaum and stating that it judicially imposed a limit on the use of lOb-5 in private actions).
35 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
36 Arthur Fleischer, Jr., Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The Im-
plications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REV. 1271, 1273 (1965).
37 Id.
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the making.38 Several days later, TGS announced the extent and
significance of the finding, and the price of its stock rose substan-
tially. 39 The SEC brought a suit under l0b-5. 4°
With respect to whether the misrepresentation (here, the false
press release) was sufficiently connected to the purchase or sale of
a security, the Second Circuit first looked to the legislative history
of section 10(b) and noted that:
The dominant congressional purposes underlying the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 were to promote free and open
public securities markets and to protect the investing public
from suffering inequities in trading, including, specifically,
inequities that follow from trading that has been stimulated
by the publication of false or misleading corporate informa-
tion releases.4'
In this case, which directly dealt with misleading statements by a
corporate issuer, the court held that the "in connection with" re-
quirement is satisfied whenever assertions are made in a manner
"reasonably calculated to influence the investing public ... if such
assertions are false or misleading or are so incomplete as to mis-
lead. 42  The court could not conclude from the record that the
press release was misleading to the reasonable investor and so the
case was remanded.43
This "reasonably calculated" language indicates that a corpo-
ration should not be held liable for misrepresentations unless a
corporation has an expectation that an investor's investment deci-
sion will be manipulated. This is certainly an attempt to limit ac-
tions against corporate issuers to those that Congress envisioned at
the time of the 1934 Act. If a misrepresentation is not calculated
to influence an investment decision, there seems to be no need to
protect the investment activity because any harm would be inci-
dental. Of course, an argument can be made that any time a mis-
representation has the effect of influencing the investment decision
the issuer should be held liable. 44 However, in looking for a link
38 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 845-46 (2d Cir. 1968); see also Com-
ment, Liability Under Rule 10b-5 for Negligently Misleading Corporate Releases: A Proposal
for the Apportionment of Losses, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 162, 164-65 (1973) (noting that two major
New York newspapers had reported the rumors of a strike while the press release issued by TGS
reported that the findings were valueless, and held a pessimistic view of the explorations, but
subsequently TGS reported a strike of a; least 25 million tons of ore).
39 Fleischer, supra note 36, at 1273.
4 Id.
41 Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 858.
42 Id. at 862.
43 Id. at 862-63.
44 Such an argument would, however, be based on a causation analysis, which is already a
[Vol. 54:4
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between the misrepresentation and the transaction, whether some-
thing actually influenced an investment decision is an issue of cau-
sation, not connection.
45
The United States Supreme Court weighed in on the "in con-
nection with" requirement in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bank-
ers Life and Casualty Co.,4 6 though the decision does not deal with
public misrepresentations by corporate issuers. In this case, Man-
hattan Casualty Company, represented by the superintendent, was
defrauded in the sale of securities.47 Bankers Life and Casualty
Company had agreed to sell all of Manhattan's stock for five mil-
lion to an individual who conspired with another individual to pay
for the stock with Manhattan's assets, rather than with their own
funds. 48 They had arranged, through a brokerage firm, to obtain
the money from a trust company with which they had no funds on
deposit.49 They then purchased the stock from Bankers Life and
sold Manhattan's corporate treasury bonds to credit against the
five million dollars, thus using Manhattan's assets to purchase the
stock.50
The Supreme Court found that, as the seller of treasury bonds,
Manhattan was protected by section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5. 51 The Court further stated that
"Section 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and restric-
tively. 52 It held that Manhattan had stated a cause of action be-
cause the "crux of the ... case is that Manhattan suffered an injury
as a result of deceptive practices touching its sale of securities as
an investor., 53 Subsequent decisions in the federal circuits grasped
this "touching" language and held the "in connection with" re-
quirement satisfied whenever the fraud touched the transaction-
not a high standard.54 The scope of the opinion in Bankers Life
part of a lOb-5 action and does not go to the issue of connection.
45 See Muratori, supra note 23, at 1061 (discussing an approach of causation in the "in
connection with" requirement analysis as being troubling to both scholars and courts because
there is a separate element of causation and that such "but for" causation should not be enough
to trigger liability).
- 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
47 Id. at 7.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 8.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 9.
52 Id. at 12.
53 Id. at 12-13.
54 See Bruce G. Vanyo & Terry T. Johnson, Restrictions on the Scope of the Civil Liability
Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1986: PROSECUTION AND
DEFENSE STRATEGIES 255, 317 (PLI Sept. 1986) (discussing Bankers Life, and stating that until
1975 the Supreme Court took an expansive view of the securities laws believing that the laws
had to be construed flexibly to effectuate the remedial purpose intended by Congress); Lewis D.
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was potentially limitless,55 eliminating a principal means of caging
the broad antifraud provision that is lOb-5. 56
Four years later, the Supreme Court limited private actions
under lOb-5. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,57 the
Court held that offerees who declined to purchase securities under
a court-ordered offering, due to a pessimistically false and mis-
leading prospectus, could not sue under lOb-5 because they were
not actual purchasers or sellers of securities. 58  These facts con-
form more closely to the scenario of a public misrepresentation by
a corporate issuer and provide evidence of an effort to limit actions
under lOb-5. This limitation comes through the use of the "pur-
chaser or seller" element. As the SEC does not need to be a pur-
chaser or seller of securities to bring suit, the "in connection with"
requirement could serve as a limit to its actions. Though conferred
with "discretionary and elastic" powers, the SEC should not go
unchecked. The counterargument is that protection of investors
requires that the SEC not be limited in its actions against corporate
issuers. 59  On balance, it seems that placing a limit on the SEC's
ability to pursue actions against corporations, by confining the "in
connection with" requirement, would not be a heavy restraint on
its power.
Now, we must consider the present. In the 2002 decision of
SEC v. Zandford,6° the issue facing the court was whether a securi-
Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Rule lOb-5's "In Connection With": A Nexus for Securities
Fraud, 57 Bus. LAw. 1, 8 (2001) (noting that use of the word "touching" is all encompassing
and has been widely cited, giving the example of United States v. Russo, 74 F.3d 1383 (2d Cir.
1996), where the court relied on the language to sustain fraud convictions of brokerage firm
executives).
55 Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 54, at 8 (discussing the scope of lOb-5 liability as a
result of the decision in Bankers Life). Additionally, one court found that the Justice Douglas'
use of the word "touching" in the Bankers Life opinion was nothing more than his variation of
"in connection with" as a matter of literary style. Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
726 F.2d 930, 942 (2d Cir. 1984).
56 Mark D. Wigder, The Supreme Court's Holding in Superintendent of Insurance v.
Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), May Force a Renewed Search for a Limiting
Doctrine for Rule Job-5 Liability, 50 TEx. L. REV. 1273, 1273 (1971-1972) (noting that lOb-5
threatened to sweep further into state corporation law and bring out a whole new set of federal
cases as well).
57 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
58 Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 54, at 9 (summarizing the Court's holding, citing
Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 726-27, 755).
59 See Charles T. Williams, III, Comment, Semerenko v. Cendant Corp.: Has the Time
Come to Prune the "Judicial Oak"?, 27 DEL. J. COP. L. 587, 609-10 (2002) (arguing that in
some situations where there is a high proximity between the misrepresentation and the corpora-
tion's own securities courts should use the relaxed materiality and dissemination standard in
analyzing the "in connection with" requirement, and that to require more would "frustrate the
enforcement power of the SEC and place a potentially insurmountable burden on Rule l0b-5
private plaintiffs with valid claims").
60 122 S. Ct. 1899 (2002).
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ties broker's fraudulent conduct was "in connection with" the pur-
chase or sale of a security.6' Although this case involved a third-
party broker, 62 it is the latest interpretation of the "in connection
with" requirement by the Court. The defendant broker therein
convinced an elderly man to open a $419,255 joint investment ac-
count and to grant the broker discretion to manage it.63 On twenty-
five occasions, money was transferred from the elderly man's ac-
count to accounts controlled by the defendant. 64 The SEC sued
under 1Ob-5.65
The Court said that the purpose of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 was "to insure honest securities markets and thereby
promote investor confidence." 66 The Court added that the statute
must not be construed so flexibly as to convert into a violation of
section 10(b) every case of common law fraud that happens to in-
volve a security.67 The Court even noted that the SEC and the
Court have never held that there must be a misrepresentation as to
the value of a security in order for conduct to be a violation of the
Act. 68 The defendant was found to be in violation because the in-
vestor was injured due to the deception's depriving him of any
compensation for the sale of his valuable securities. 69 This deci-
sion demonstrates that the SEC and the Supreme Court have not-
and do not-endorse a narrow approach to the "in connection
with" requirement. It also indicates that common law or commer-
cial fraud is not within the scope of lOb-5. Although the decision
does not deal with a public misrepresentation by a corporate issuer,
it suggests both that courts should proceed with caution in analyz-
ing the "in connection with" requirement and that corporations
should be protected when the misrepresentation does not influence
an investment decision.
C. Trends in Securities Laws
Trends in securities legislation show that corporations have
been increasingly afforded more protection. Congress began fo-
61 Id. at 1901.
62 It is thus a category 3 case. Fletcher, supra note 6, at 936 (stating that third category
cases are those in which the question is whether the securities transaction involved was in con-
nection with the activities of third parties who were not securities traders but whose deception
affects securities transactions).
63 Zandford, 122 S. Ct. at 1901.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 1903 (citing United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997)).
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 1904.
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cusing on securities litigation reform toward the end of 1991 as
corporate issuers argued that a broader, better defined safe harbor
was needed because companies that voluntarily disclosed forward-
looking statements were exposed to a dramatically increased risk
of securities fraud class actions.70 Corporate issuers believed that
existing safe harbor provisions were inadequate because courts did
not apply them consistently.71 Surveys suggested that the threat of
mass shareholder litigation, whether real or perceived, deterred the
72voluntary disclosure of forward-looking statements.
In 1995, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act ("Reform Act") 73 to "protect investors, issuers, and all
who are associated with our capital markets from abusive securi-
ties litigation., 74  The Reform Act amended the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 in two principal ways. First, it provided a safe
harbor for specific forward-looking statements in order to encour-
age corporations to disclose information about future prospects
without the fear of frivolous litigation. 75 Second, it changed sev-
eral requirements for private claim litigation under the federal se-
curities laws.76
The statutory safe harbor provision was intended to encourage
the voluntary disclosure of forward-looking statements by provid-
ing a procedure for the summary disposition of claims that were
based on allegedly false or misleading predictive statements.
77
Although the safe harbor applies only to private claims, 78 it evi-
dences the intent of Congress to afford corporations more protec-
tion from damaging lawsuits, but at the same time protect investors
by encouraging corporate disclosure. Forward-looking statements
receive protection when they are identified as such and are accom-
panied by cautionary statements that identify factors that could
cause actual results to differ materially from those stated.79 Even
if cautionary statements do not accompany a forward-looking
70 Phillip D. Parker, The New Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, in SWEEPING
REFORM: LITIGATING AND BESPEAKING CAUTION UNDER THE NEW SECURrTis LAW 269, 273
(PLI Feb.-Mar. 1996).
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
74 H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 32 (1995).
75 Davis, supra note 3, at 409-10.
76 Id.
77 Parker, supra note 70, at 271.
78 Davis, supra note 3, at 410 (noting that the safe harbor provision does not apply to SEC
enforcement and criminal actions) (citing Reform Act § 102(b), 109 Stat. at 754) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1) (2000)).
79 Id. at 411 (citing Reform Act § 102(b), 109 Stat. at 754) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i) (2000)).
[Vol. 54:4
"IN CONNECTION WITH"
statement, a lOb-5 plaintiff must prove that the statement was
made with actual knowledge that it was false or misleading.8 ° This
safe harbor provision arguably is sufficient protection for corpora-
tions that are fearful their statements may later turn out to be false
and, thus, form the basis of a lOb-5 action. However, though the
safe harbor provision applies only to private claims, the SEC may
wield its "discretionary and elastic" power and bring a suit when
the corporation otherwise believed that it was protected. Thus, a
limitation using the "in connection with" requirement is necessary.
The Reform Act provided for a heightened pleading standard
that requires dismissal of complaints that are not specific enough
with respect to an allegedly misleading statement or with respect
to a defendant's state of mind. 81 The Securities Exchange Act of
1934 now requires that complaints alleging securities fraud "spec-
ify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or
reasons why the statement or omission is misleading, and, if an
allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on informa-
tion and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all the
facts on which that belief is formed. 82 Thus, plaintiffs must have
adequate facts upon which to base their claims before proceeding
with litigation.83 While this legislation offers further protection to
corporations, it does not necessarily protect against a plaintiff's
bringing an action based on commercial or common law fraud and
linking it to a securities transaction. This renders the "in connec-
tion with" requirement crucial for limiting actionable conduct to
that which is clearly a prohibited manipulation: it can effectively
bar plaintiffs who would otherwise succeed, despite having alleged
an inadequate nexus, because the heightened pleading is only an
obstacle as far as particularity in pleading is concerned.
Another example of the congressional movement toward more
protection for corporate issuers is the Securities Litigation Uni-
form Standards Act of 1998.84 It became apparent to Congress that
the purpose of the Reform Act was being frustrated because plain-
tiffs were evading the heightened pleading requirements by suing
80 Id. (citing Reform Act § 102(b), 109 Stat. at 754) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-5(c)(1)(B) (2000)).
81 Id. at 412.
82 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 101(b), 109
Stat. 737, 747 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2000)).
83 See Nathenson v. Zonagen, Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 407 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that a lOb-5
plaintiff must plead specific facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter, and that motive
and opportunity are insufficient).
84 Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
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in state court rather than federal court. 85 The purpose of the Uni-
form Standards Act is to preempt actions in state courts based
upon alleged securities fraud, and is achieved by the Act's focus-
ing specifically on regulating class actions. 86  Thus, with few ex-
ceptions, federal court is the sole avenue for securities fraud class
actions, 87 and the heightened pleading standards of the Reform Act
apply. This is strong evidence that corporations are to be given
greater protection under the securities laws. Although this legisla-
tion is helpful in protecting corporations from frivolous class ac-
tions, it does not protect against individual actions by investors.88
There is also the problem of the inadequacy of the pleading re-
quirement. One could argue that these individual actions involve
less money and are, therefore, something that corporations do not
need protection from. However, due to the public relations night-
mare that could result from a securities fraud action, corporations
should at least have protection from those individual actions that
are frivolous.
The most recent legislation in securities law is the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002.89 Sarbanes-Oxley was Congress' response to
the financial collapses of Enron, WorldCom, and Global Cross-
85 Behlen v. Merrill Lynch, 311 F.3d 1087, 1091 (1 lth Cir. 2002); see also SEC Commis-
sioner Wallman Sees Need for Uniform Standards Law, 29 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1259,
1259 (Sept. 12, 1997) (reporting that SEC Commissioner Wallman believed that it did not make
sense to expect corporations to disclose information that would be protected at the federal level,
but would still subject them to state law claims); Litigation Reform: Congress Targets "Loop-
hole" in 1995 Act Barring Vexatious Suits, 29 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1211, 1211 (Aug. 29,
1997) (noting that before the Reform Act was a year old, plaintiffs' attorneys were doing "an
end run" around it by suing in state court). It should be noted that a party seeking to remove an
action to federal court under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act has the burden of
proving that (1) the suit is a covered class action; (2) the plaintiffs claims are state law based;
(3) one or more covered securities have been purchased or sold; and (4) the defendant misrepre-
sented or omitted a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of the security. Behlen,
311 F.3d at 1092 (quoting Riley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 292 F.3d 1334,
1342 (11 th Cir. 2002)).
86 Catina & Schmitt, supra note 19, at 311-12.
87 Behlen, 311 F.3d at 1091-92 (also noting that Congress further mandated that the class
actions would be governed by federal securities law and not state law) (citing H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 105-803, at 13 (1997)).
88 Congress did attempt to fill the gap left by the Reform Act with the Securities Litigation
Improvement Act of 1997. H.R. 1653, 105th Cong. (1997). It would have created uniform
pleading standards for individual stockholders that allege securities fraud with respect to feder-
ally regulated securities in actions brought in state court. See Catina & Schmitt, supra note 19,
at 311 (describing the bill as a response to strike suits brought in state courts). The bill, how-
ever, failed to pass. See Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption
of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 n.2 (1998) (noting that the
bill did not proceed further than the House of Representatives).
89 Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 ("Sarbanes-
Oxley"), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and other chapters).
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ing.90 This Act attempts to improve investor protection and rein-
force the securities laws. The five major components to the Act
are "(1) new requirements for audit committees and auditors, in-
cluding restrictions on non-audit services; (2) new corporate gov-
ernance standards for directors and executive officers; (3) ex-
tended company disclosures; (4) increased enforcement and pen-
alty schemes; and (5) mandated special studies." 91 This is not nec-
essarily a shift in securities legislation trends toward more protec-
tion for investors because, in large part, Sarbanes-Oxley simply
supplements and fills loopholes in previous securities laws.92  As
such, it should not be construed as opening up the floodgates for
lOb-5 liability. As courts will undoubtedly be flooded with securi-
ties law actions based on public misrepresentations by corporate
issuers, it is now a critical time to strike the balance between pro-
tection of investors and protection of corporations, and to limit
lOb-5 actions.
Given these trends in the past ten years, it appears that Con-
gress has moved in the direction of affording corporations more
protection. The attempt to rein in actions under lOb-5 is evident,
and courts should try to limit frivolous actions. The "in connec-
tion with" requirement is just the device to limit frivolous lOb-5
claims since it is the link between the fraud and the securities
transaction: there is nothing more frivolous than an action based
upon a misrepresentation having a merely tangential connection to
securities or a transaction involving securities. If there is ambigu-
ity in a lOb-5 action, it is with respect to how close the fraud has
to be to the transaction. Courts should adopt a test that eliminates
the ambiguity by requiring a corporation to have had a reasonable
expectation of influencing an investment decision in order for the
"in connection with" requirement to be satisfied.93
90 See Jenny B. Davis, Sorting Out Sarbanes-Oxley: Determining How to Comply with the
New Federal Disclosure Law for Corporations Won't Be Easy, 89 A.B.A. J. 44, 45 (Feb. 2003)
("In its essence, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is about disclosure. Crafted by Congress in the
aftermath of financial collapses at corporations like Enron, Global Crossing, and WorldCom, the
new law establishes the framework for a new regime of accountability by public companies in
the areas of financial reporting and disclosure, audits, conflicts of interest and governance.").
91 Ethan G. Zelizer, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Accounting for Corporate Corruption?, 15
Loy. CONSUMER L. REv. 27, 40 (2002).
92 Id. It has been noted that "emerging empirical research suggests that many factors
other than fraud are accountable for the market's rise and fall at the end of the millennium."
Joseph A. Grundfest, Punctuated Equilibria in the Evolution of the United States Securities
Regulation, 8 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 1, 3 (2002) (also noting that it has been demonstrated that
the price declines in U.S. equity markets are comparable to those in other countries that have not
experienced high-profile accounting and governance scandals).
93 See JAMES D. Cox, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 691 (2d ed. 1997) (noting that a person could take the
"delimiting statutory language as an expression of intent to restrict the coverage of the antifraud
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II. DISPARATE CIRCUIT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
"IN CONNECTION WITH" REQUIREMENT
There are inconsistent standards for the "in connection with"
requirement between the circuits and even within them.94 The ap-
proach adopted by a circuit may apply regardless of the factual
scenario, 95 though the test is normally highly fact specific. 96 This
Part looks at some of the approaches taken and inquires how an
approach would work in a case of public dissemination of mislead-
ing information by a corporate issuer. A balance between protec-
tion of investors and corporations must be sought, as well as rec-
ognition that the connection is more attenuated than the paradig-
matic securities fraud case.
A. The Broad and Narrow Approaches
1. A Broad Approach May Not Be Sufficient
Lewis D. Lowenfels and Alan R. Bromberg have identified
several circuits that have adopted a broad construction of the "in
connection with" requirement. 97 The Second Circuit follows a
broad approach,98 as illustrated by Press v. Chemical Investment
Services Corp.99 In Press, the purchaser of a corporate treasury
bill alleged that Chemical did not disclose that the funds at matur-
ity would not be immediately available, so the period over which
the yield should have been calculated was longer than the invest-
ment company represented.1'° This was done, Press claimed, so
prohibition of the securities laws in ambiguous cases to those situations where the person who
was allegedly defrauded was engaged in investment-related activity") (citing LHLC Corp. v.
Cluett, Peabody & Co., 842 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1987)).
94 See Barbara Black, The Second Circuit's Approach to the 'In Connection With' Re-
quirement of Rule lOb-5, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 539, 541-44 (1987) (noting the district courts'
interpretation of the requirement after Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930
(2d Cir. 1984) and the clarification in SEC v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 785 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986)).
95 Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 54, at 19 ("A number of federal circuit courts have
utilized different legal standards in applying lOb-5's 'in connection with' language in a number
of different factual settings [and there exists] a dichotomy between a broad and a narrow judicial
interpretation.").
96 See Maloney, supra note 5, at 1182 (citing Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165,
174 (3d Cir. 2000) for noting that the scope of the "in connection with" requirement must be
made on a case-by-case basis, and In re Ames Dep't Stores, Inc. Stock Litig., 991 F.2d 953, 962
(2d Cir. 1993) for noting that borderline cases require a cautious case by case approach); see
also Muratori, supra note 23, at 1060 (noting that courts widely claim that the sufficiency of the
"in connection with" requirement is made on a case-by-case basis).
97 Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 54, at 19. In addition, Lowenfels and Bromberg
have identified cases that have adopted a narrow approach. ld at 21-23.
98 But see Black, supra note 94, at 540 (discussing the conflict within the Second Circuit).
99 166 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 1999).
'0o Id. at 533.
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that Chemical would have more time to use the funds. He thus had
to pay an additional fee to get the funds four calendar days after
the maturity date.1 ' The district court held that the plaintiff's
claim that he was improperly denied prompt access to the funds
from his treasury bill failed, because the misrepresentation was not
related directly enough to the security's value to satisfy the "in
connection with" requirement. The Second Circuit rejected this
reasoning. 102 It stated that the district court confused the material-
ity analysis with the "in connection with" analysis in finding that
the yield availability date did not pertain to the security itself or its
value. 0 3 The Second Circuit noted that it had interpreted the "in
connection with" requirement broadly so that the act complained
of need only have somehow induced the purchaser to make the
purchase.104 Therefore, the alleged yield delay was "in connection
with" the sale of a security and, if there was an issue, it was an
issue of materiality.1
0 5
The Seventh Circuit has also adopted a broad approach. SEC
v. Jakubowski,106 is a case in which the defendant, an attorney,
lined up stock from savings associations that were abandoning the
mutual form.'0 7 Historically, managers took advantage of this and
issued stock at a low price so that they can appropriate the net
worth of the company for themselves. 0 8 The SEC passed several
regulations to limit managers' ability to line up stock./°9 The
president of Generation Capital Associates ("GCA"), a venture
capital firm, contacted Jakubowski to tell him that Cragin Federal
Bank for Savings was converting from mutual to stock form, and
asked the attorney to find a depositor who was eligible to purchase
stock." 0 The president of GCA offered to supply the capital nec-
101 Id.
102 Id. at 537.
1
03 Id.
104Jd. (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860-61 (2d Cir. 1968)).
105 Id.
1- 150 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1998).
107 Id. at 677. Lining up stock occurs when a savings and loan association, which is a fi-
nancial intermediary organized in a mutual form that can issue only debt, converts to stock to
raise money. Id.
1
0 8 Id. The court gives the example of an S&L that has assets of $200 million and a net
worth of $10 million, the managers could take the firm public with issuance of one million
shares at $10/share; the firm would then have a net worth of $20 million and the initial buyers,
who would most likely be managers, would have the advantage of paying $10/share for stock
that would now trade at $20/share. Id.
09Id. (citing 12 C.F.R. § 563b.3, which limits managers' ability to invest when a mutual
converts to stock form and gives each account holder a right to purchase some of the stock, and
12 C.F.R. § 563b.3(i), which prevents managers from buying the account holders' for a meager
amount by making the rights non-transferable).
110Id. at 678.
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essary to buy as much stock as possible, and to pay Jakubowski
3.5% of any profit. The stock, however, had to be lined up before
it was issued because afterward the initial buyers could just sell to
the market.11 The attorney found a secretary at his law firm who
was eligible to purchase the stock, and she agreed to let Jaku-
bowski use her subscription rights. 112 Cragin issued the stock to
the secretary, but never saw the document that assigned ownership
of the stock to GCA and the contract that awarded to the secretary
6.75% of any profit that GCA would obtain through the subsequent
sale of the stock.11 3 GCA sold the stock and paid both the secre-
tary and the defendant as promised. The defendant subsequently
engaged in a series of similar transactions. 1 4 The SEC sued, alleg-
ing that the attorney violated Rule lOb-5 because the stock pur-
chase forms, which Jakubowski completed, falsely stated that the
stock was being purchased by the secretary, when in fact GCA was
purchasing it.
1 15
The court noted that the defendant made his statements di-
rectly to the issuer of the securities (Cragin) in order to induce the
sale.116 Since Jakubowski represented himself as a purchaser (by
signing the stock purchase form along with the secretary) and
Cragin was selling the securities, the court stated that the "in con-
nection with" requirement was met. 117 Noting that "a misrepresen-
tation can be 'in connection with' the purchase or sale of securities
only if it influences an investment decision,"' 1 8 the court found
that Jakubowski and the president of GCA made investment deci-
sions when they purchased stock issued by the converting S&Ls,
because they intended to sell the securities purchased to make a
profit. 1 9
Although the purchasers in Jakubowski (GCA, the secretary,
120
and the defendant) were defrauding the seller (Cragin), the rea-
soning of the case can translate to a situation where a misrepresen-
tation is made by neither a purchaser nor a seller, but by a corpo-
rate issuer. The court stated that requiring an investment decision
Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
l141d
,14Id.
116 Id. at 679.
l lId.
11 Id. at 680 (citing Isquith v. Caremark International, Inc., 136 F.3d 531, 534-36 (7th Cir.
1998); LHLC Corp. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., 842 F.2d 928, 931-32 (7th Cir. 1988); Harris
Trust & Savings Bank v. Ellis, 810 F.2d 700, 704 (7th Cir. 1987)).
11 9d.
12OThis is paradigmatic securities fraud where the connection is apparent, in that the pur-
chaser is directly defrauding the seller of the securities. Fletcher, supra note 6, at 929-30.
[Vol. 54:4
"IN CONNECTION WITH"
to be affected by the misrepresentation is consistent with the Su-
preme Court's holding in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green1 21 that
"corporate mismanagement and [other] similar wrongs do not vio-
late lOb-5 even though they may affect the price at which securi-
ties trade."' 122 The Seventh Circuit's observation that acts may af-
fect the value of a security, yet not violate lOb-5 under Santa Fe,
is evidence that a narrow approach would not capture conduct in-
tended to be prohibited. This case, by adopting a broad approach,
indicates that limitation of corporate liability through the use of
the "in connection with" requirement is possible, if not desirable.
It would seem that such limitation in public misrepresentation
cases would be desirable as well, since the connection is more at-
tenuated than in paradigmatic securities fraud. To require the se-
curity itself to be affected ignores the fact that the one who was
wronged was not the security, but the one making the investment
decision.
The Tenth Circuit adopted a broad approach in United Inter-
national Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf (Holdings) Limited,123 which in-
volved an operator of cable television systems, United Interna-
tional Holdings ("UIH"), suing Wharf, which obtained a license to
operate a cable television system in Hong Kong. 124 UIH asserted
that it had provided services to Wharf that enabled it to obtain a
cable license and to implement the system. 125 UIH further claimed
that it had an option to buy ten percent of the cable system as com-
pensation and that Wharf misled it and never intended to honor the
option. 26 One claim for relief was based on lOb-5. The sale of
the option was admitted by Wharf to be a sale of a security, so the
issue was whether the misrepresentations were "in connection
with" the purchase or sale of a security. 127 The court found that
the misrepresentations were allegedly made to induce UIH's in-
vestment decision to purchase the option.
28
121430 U.S. 462 (1977).
122 Jakubowski, 150 F.3d at 680.
1- 210 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2000).
124 Id. at 1214.
125Id. at 1219.
126 Id.
1
27Id. at 1221.
128 Id. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision by the Tenth Circuit. Wharf (Hold-
ings) Ltd. v. United Int'l Holdings, Inc., 532 U.S. 588 (2001). It was noted that "[e]ven were it
the case that the Act covers only misrepresentations likely to affect the value of securities,
Wharfs secret reservation was such a misrepresentation. To sell an option while secretly in-
tending not to permit the option's exercise is misleading, because a buyer normally presumes
good faith." id. at 589.
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2. The Narrow Approach Does Not Capture Prohibited Conduct
Some courts have taken a narrow view of Rule lOb-5's "in
connection with" requirement, generally by insisting that the mis-
representations affect the price or value of the security. 129 The
principal case adopting this approach is Chemical Bank v. Arthur
Andersen & Co. 130
In Chemical Bank,131 three actions were brought by four banks
that had made loans to Frigitemp Corp. and its wholly owned sub-
sidiary, Elsters, Inc. 132 Frigitemp sought to expand and acquire
other companies, but it needed large amounts of capital and, con-
sequently, a restructuring of its debt.' 33 In order to restructure its
debt, Frigitemp engaged in a series of transactions resulting in
$15.5 million in debt. One transaction was a $4 million advance,
for which Frigitemp pledged 100% of Elsters' common stock, pur-
suant to a pledge and security agreement.' 34 About one year later,
after Frigitemp had paid approximately $4 million to the banks, it
filed for bankruptcy and the banks sued. 135 The banks argued that
Arthur Andersen & Co., an accounting firm, and three principal
officers of Frigitemp had violated lob-5 on the basis that they
knew that Frigitemp's financial statements were false and mislead-
ing. 136 Andersen argued that, even if it had made a materially false
statement or had omitted to state a material fact, the statement or
omission was not "in connection with" the banks' purchase or
Frigitemp's sale of the Elsters stock by way of the pledge to secure
the $4 million loan made to Elsters. 137
The Second Circuit, while deciding that the pledge of stock
was a sale of a security, concluded that the misrepresentation was
not "in connection with" the stock's sale or purchase. 138 The court
reasoned that the purpose of Rule lOb-5 is:
to protect persons who are deceived in securities transac-
tions- to make sure that buyers of securities get what they
think they are getting and that sellers of securities are not
tricked into parting with something for a price known to the
129 See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 54, at 21 (describing specific situations in
which courts have taken a narrow view of Rule lOb-5).
130 726 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1984).
131 Id.
132 Id. at 931.
133 Id. at 932.
134 Id. at 933.
135 Id.
136Id. at 933-34.
137 Id. at 941.
131 Id. at 945.
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buyer to be inadequate or for a consideration known to the
buyer not to be what it purports to be.1
39
According to the court, the banks got exactly what they expected,
as the misrepresentation was with respect to the financial descrip-
tion of Frigitemp, not the Elsters stock.140
Another Second Circuit case following a narrow approach to
the "in connection with" requirement is Anatian v. Coutts Bank
(Switzerland) Ltd.41  The plaintiffs in this case were Rachamin
Anatian, seven limited liability companies that he controlled, and
Mordechai and Margaret Gal-Oliver.142 Anatian became a client of
Coutts Bank, borrowing $3.7 million, and securing it with shares
of stock he owned in USA Detergents. Anatian founded and be-
came the principal shareholder of Global Shopping Network
("GSN"), and Global Broadcasting System ("GBS"). 143 The plain-
tiffs claimed that between 1995 and 1997, Coutts representatives
fraudulently induced Anatian to borrow $100 million to purchase
TV stations and supply the private equity element for the initial
public offering of GSN.144 Coutts representatives additionally per-
suaded Anatian to create seven limited liability companies to
which the bank could loan money for Anatian's benefit, while at
the same time circumventing the internal and legal per-borrower
lending limits.1 45 The Coutts representatives assured Anatian that
the arrangement would satisfy its internal lending regulations and
that the New York office had the authority to make loans without
the approval of any other Coutts office. 46 The Gal-Olivers also
claimed that Coutts representatives convinced them to borrow $2
million, half being retained in a Coutts certificate of deposit, and
half being used by the Gal-Olivers to purchase GSN stock.
147
Anatian pledged his stock in USA Detergents as collateral for his
loan and arranged for the limited liability companies to pledge
GSN stock as collateral for the loans. The plaintiffs alleged that
Coutts falsely inflated the value of the GSN stock in order to ex-
tend more credit to them. 148 After loaning all this money, the
139 Id. at 943.
1401d. The court went on to state that "it is not sufficient to allege that a defendant has
committed a proscribed act in a transaction of which the pledge of a security is a part." Id.
141 193 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 1999).
142 Id. at 86.
143 Id. at 87.
14Id.
145 Id.
146Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
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Coutts representatives reneged on the loan commitment.1 49  With-
out further credit, there could be no public offering, and GSN was
forced to declare bankruptcy. 50
Coutts initially sued the plaintiffs for defaulting on over $40
million in loan obligations. 151 In response, the plaintiffs brought
action under section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.1 2
The court found that the "[pilaintiffs' claim that Coutts deceived
them by inflating the value of GSN stock in order to extend them
more credit falls short of the mark. It is not sufficient to allege
fraud in a transaction in which a security is a part."'
153
3. A Balanced Approach Is Necessary
A balance between protection of investors and corporations
must be sought, as well as recognition that the connection is more
attenuated than the paradigmatic securities fraud case. An ap-
proach requiring a reasonable expectation of influencing an in-
vestment decision best serves this purpose. Expectation provides
the link between the misrepresentation and the securities transac-
tion. A corporation could, for example, make a public statement
that it desires its financial situation to improve in the near future.
Such a statement could be pure optimism,154 and not reasonably
expected to influence an investor into purchasing or selling a secu-
rity, though the corporation knows that its financial situation is
likely to remain stable. Once the corporation can reasonably ex-
pect that an investor's decision to buy or sell a security will be in-
fluenced by its misrepresentation, it has crossed the line and has
made itself part of the transaction.
14 9 Id. The Coutts representatives claimed that the home office put an end to the arrange-
ment. Id.
15Old.
151 Id; see also Anatian v. Courts Bank, Nos. 97 Civ. 9280, 97 Civ. 9492, 1998 WL
526440, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 1998).
152Anatian, 193 F.3d at 87.
153 Id. at 88 (citing Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 943 (2d Cir.
1984)).
54See Suna v. Bailey Corp., 107 F.3d 64, 70 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting statements that con-
vey the company's desire for profitable performance in the future that do not contain promises
about future performances and do not contain specific numbers should not be actionable because
no reasonable investor would rely on those statements); see also Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc.,
267 F.3d 400, 419 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that generalized positive statements about a com-
pany's progress and puffery are not bases for liability under the securities laws); Nairobi Hold-
ings Ltd. v. Brown Bros. Harriman & Co., No. 02 Civ. 1230, 2002 WL 31027550, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2002); In re Lucent Technologies, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 00-CV-621, 2002
WL 1396852, at *14 (D.N.J. June 26, 2002). But see Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d
497, 501 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that projections and general expressions of optimism may be
actionable under the securities laws).
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The broad approach is generally sufficient. Although Press is
a category 3 case involving a third-party broker, it is closely con-
nected to the category 2 cases in which there is a misrepresentation
by a corporate issuer. 155 Thus, the reasoning in Press can be used
in cases where there has been a public misrepresentation by a cor-
porate issuer on a matter not directly related to the actual transac-
tion. As noted by the court, "[t]angential misrepresentations about
a security are insufficient to support a claim under Section
10(b).' 56 The test here ensures that conduct that in no way influ-
ences a party's decision to purchase or sell a security does not lead
to lOb-5 liability. It would seem that if tangential misrepresenta-
tions about a security should not result in liability under lOb-5,
then tangential misrepresentations that are made public and do not
influence an investment decision should similarly evade liability.
However, the broad approach may not work well if imple-
mented incorrectly. The court in United International Holdings
adopted the "intent to influence an investment decision" test and
found that the plaintiff could state a claim under lOb-5.157 To pro-
tect the investment decision, which, in that case, was providing
services in exchange for the right to purchase an option, liability
should attach. The misrepresentation did not affect the underlying
value of the security, but it did lead the plaintiff to expend substan-
tial time, effort, and money in order to get the cable system up and
running.15 8 The problem with the broad approach here is not that it
fails to establish a connection between the misrepresentation and
the transaction, but rather that the word "intent" may be too limit-
ing in a public misrepresentation context. A "reasonable expecta-
tion" test can establish a connection with a lesser standard. 1
59
Therefore, a broad approach to the interpretation of the "in
connection with" requirement is necessary in order to strike a bal-
ance between protection of investors and protection of corpora-
155 Here the closeness is even more evident as the broker had a responsibility to the inves-
tor resembling that of a corporation, which a different type of third party, namely an accounting
firm, would not have.
156 Press v. Chemical Investment Services Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 537 (2d Cir. 1999).
15 United Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf (Holdings) Ltd., 210 F.3d 1207, 1221 (10th Cir.
2000) (citing SEC v. Jakubowski, 150 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 1998) and Angelastro v. Pruden-
tial-Bache Secs., Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 943 (3d Cir. 1985)).
158 Though United International Holdings deals with a private misrepresentation by a seller
of a security (Wharf selling the option) and not a third-party corporate issuer, the case works
well in the public misrepresentation by corporate issuer context because it is protecting the
investment activity (specifically, the investment decision) and that is what Congress sought to
protect. See supra Part LA (discussing the legislative history of section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934).
159 See infra notes 262-64 and accompanying text (discussing a "reasonable expectation"
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tions. Misrepresentations that are tangential or ancillary to a secu-
rities transaction should not necessarily trigger lOb-5 liability. A
reasonable expectation that the misrepresentation will influence
the investment decision ensures a proper nexus between the mis-
representation and the securities transaction in the public misrepre-
sentation context. Other elements of lOb-5 emphasize mindset
(i.e., reliance of the plaintiff and scienter of the defendant) but
they do not necessarily connect the fraud (which has the mindset
elements) to the transaction. An expectation that the misrepresen-
tation will influence the investment decision bridges this gap.
The narrow approach captures too little conduct. This is es-
pecially so in cases in which a corporation disseminated mislead-
ing information because the security may not have been affected,
but an investor was influenced in the purchasing or selling of a
security. Even if the misrepresentation is not with respect to the
corporation's own securities, it could influence an investor to pur-
chase or sell a security.
Though Chemical Bank is a category 3 case, in which a third
party (not the corporate issuer) is making the misrepresentation, it
is still related to the category 2 cases in which the corporation has
made a misleading statement.'6 Although the misrepresentation
arguably influenced the decision of the banks to "invest" in
Frigitemp by accepting the pledge as collateral for the loan, 16' this
seems to be the type of common law or commercial fraud that
should not be linked to a securities transaction, because the pledge
of stock was only ancillary to the transaction. The court's reason-
ing is problematic, as it requires that the misrepresentation bear on
the value of the security. 62  The stock itself was not affected by
the fraud, but to look only at whether the price or value of a stock
160Fletcher, supra note 6, at 936-37 (stating that the third category is similar to the second
category because the party who is potentially liable is not an actual buyer or seller of securities,
but has made statements affecting the transaction).
161 Judge Van Graafeiland, in his concurring and dissenting opinion, argued that Frigitemp
owned all of the Elsters stock, making Elsters a wholly owned subsidiary. Thus, misrepresenta-
tions about Frigitemp would directly link to the Elsters stock. Judge Van Graafeiland observed
that the pledge of the securities for the $4,000,000 loan was "a single transaction, a package
deal, no part of which could have stood alone. To say, therefore, that there was no connection
between the fraudulent misstatement of solvency and the 'sale' of the asset and that 'the Banks
got exactly what they expected' is simply to blink reality." Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen
& Co., 726 F.2d 930, 945 (2d Cir. 1984) (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring and dissenting) (quot-
ing the majority opinion). Van Graafeiland also stated that both the obligation and the guaran-
tee of its performance were directly connected to the pledge. Id. at 947. See Lowenfels &
Bromberg, supra note 54, at 23 (noting that "the dissent's reasoning appears more cogent").
162 See Ambassador Hotel Co., Ltd. v. Wei-Chuan Investment, 189 F.3d 1017, 1026 (9th
Cir. 1999) (finding that the fraud had to relate to the nature of the security, but recognizing that
the fraud did not have to relate to the investment value of the securities themselves, the court
found that the fraud must have more than a tangential relation to the securities at issue).
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is affected ignores the congressional goal of protecting the inves-
tor's investment activity rather than the stock itself. Thus, this
narrow analysis does not suffice to protect investors in a public
misrepresentation context, though the court here ultimately came
to the correct conclusion: Andersen could not have reasonably ex-
pected that its misrepresentation concerning Frigitemp would in-
fluence an investor in a transaction in which Elsters stock was a
part.
This finding that the fraud was too remotely connected to the
securities transaction to trigger lOb-5 liability is appropriate be-
cause there was no purchase or sale. Still, the "in connection
with" element must be addressed. The problem here, as in all nar-
row approach cases, is not with the result, but rather with the
analysis. Indeed, this may be a prime example of when lOb-5
should not apply. However, the court was too restrictive in its
analysis since it ignored the possibility that, in other factual sce-
narios, the entity making the misrepresentation may influence an
investor to purchase or sell a security.1
63
The narrow approach, 164 requiring that the underlying value of
the security be affected, fails to recognize that the security may be
a part of the transaction in which the person or entity committing
the fraud influences the investor's decision to purchase the secu-
rity. This type of situation should fall within the scope of lOb-5
liability to protect the investment activity. Further, the narrow ap-
proach does not work where a corporation issues a misleading
statement about itself, since the misrepresentation may not change
the value of the security. It should make no difference whether the
corporation makes a misrepresentation about its own securities or a
separate corporation's securities: the requisite connection should
be established whenever there is an expectation that an investor
will be influenced in her investment decision. Additionally, this
approach "conjoins the 'in connection with' and materiality ele-
ments of the cause of action" 165 and, thus, does not treat the two
163 See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 54, at 23 (noting that Anatian embraced a nar-
row interpretation of the "in connection with" language in holding that the misrepresentation by
a bank to induce a customer to enter into a stock-secured loan agreement was too remotely
connected).
164For two other cases requiring that the fraud or misrepresentation affect the underlying
value of the security, see Gurwara v. LyphoMed Inc., 937 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that
an employer's misrepresentation that an employee remained eligible to exercise his stock op-
tions while on short-term disability was not "in connection with" the purchase or sale of securi-
ties and was therefore not actionable), and In re Financial Corp. of Am. Shareholder Litig., 796
F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that fraudulent advice regarding a company's accounting
treatment of government mortgage certificates was not sufficient to constitute a cause of action).
165 Cox, HILLMAN & LANGEVOORT, supra note 93, at 690 (citing Arrington v. Merrill
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requirements as distinct. A narrow approach may lead to a correct
outcome in some cases, but the analysis does not adequately pro-
tect investors in the corporate public misrepresentation context.
Thus, it is imperative that a balanced approach to interpreting
the "in connection with" requirement is used. The broad approach
may not be sufficient if implemented in a way that narrows the
conduct it captures, and the narrow approach simply does not cap-
ture enough conduct to protect investors. It is where there is a rea-
sonable expectation of influencing the investment decision that the
balance is struck.
B. In re Ames Department Stores Inc. Stock Litigation and
McGann v. Ernst & Young: Problematic Decisions
The two decisions are problematic because they lay a danger-
ous groundwork for interpreting the "in connection with" require-
ment. In Ames Department Stores Inc. Stock Litigation,166 the
plaintiff stockholders alleged that Ames's directors, officers, and
investment banker had disseminated false and misleading state-
ments regarding the company's financial condition. 67 The com-
plaint further alleged that the defendants knew that Ames's finan-
cial situation was deteriorating and that inventory reports were in-
accurate. 68 The district court dismissed the lOb-5 complaint on
the ground that the "in connection with" requirement was not satis-
fied.169 The Second Circuit reversed on two counts. First, it held
that, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Superintendent of
Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,170 which called for a
flexible reading of the requirement,1 71 the lower court had not
treated the "in connection with" requirement broadly enough, as a
matter of law. Second, it held that the district court had made an
error of fact by assuming that the plaintiff's claims were based
only on misrepresentations and omissions in a reset note and de-
benture prospectus, and were not based on misstatements and
omissions in press releases and news articles.1 72 Ames held that
the stockholders' complaint did allege that there was fraud in con-
nection with the sale or purchase of securities.
1 73
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 651 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1981), and SEC v. Jakubowski, 912 F.
Supp. 1273 (N.D. fl1. 1996)).
1- 991 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1993).
167 Id. at 955-56.
168 Id. at 956.
169 Id. at 961.
170404 U.S. 6 (1971).
171 Ames, 991 F.2d at 962.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 968.
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Ames assumes that the "in connection with" requirement is
met whenever investors rely on false information in public state-
ments and, in so relying, sell or purchase the corporation's securi-
ties. 174 This assumption is problematic. It essentially bars corpo-
rations from arguing that there was no connection, and allows in-
vestors to claim later that the fraud was connected to their pur-
chase or sale of securities. This approach makes an enormous
logical leap-from reliance in the context of fraud to the connec-
tion of fraud to a securities transaction-by allowing the same the-
ory 175 to simultaneously satisfy two distinct requirements. 176  As
such, it obliterates the "in connection with" requirement by con-
verting it into a question of reliance, which is already a part of the
cause of action.
In McGann v. Ernst & Young, 177 the plaintiffs alleged that
Ernst & Young, an accounting firm, issued a false and misleading
audit opinion concerning the accounts receivable of Community
Psychiatric Centers ("CPC"). 178 The audit opinion was included in
the Form 10-K filed by CDC with the SEC, which caused an artifi-
cial inflation of the price of its stock.179 When CPC announced a
drop in earnings due to a large, uncollectible debt, its stock price
plummeted. 180  The McGann court held that the accounting firm
could be liable under lOb-5, based on the plaintiffs' allegation that
the firm had made false assertions "in a manner reasonably calcu-
lated to influence the investing public.''
Reliance on this holding to find a corporate issuer liable has
troubling implications: while cases involving misrepresentations
by corporate issuers and cases involving third party misrepresenta-
174 Id. at 967 (citing Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1968)). The court went
on to state that the U.S. Supreme Court's adoption of the fraud on the market theory in Basic,
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), supported their position, even though Basic addressed the
reliance and materiality requirements of lOb-5 and not the "in connection with" requirement.
Ames, 991 F.2d at 967; see also infra notes 223-26 and accompanying text (for a discussion of
Basic).
175 The underlying theory is the fraud on the market theory. See infra notes 223-26 and ac-
companying text (for a discussion of the fraud on the market theory in the context of an "in
connection with" requirement analysis).
176 See SEC v. Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that the de-
fendant treated the concepts of "reliance" and "in connection with" as interchangeable, but they
are in fact very distinct).
177 102 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996).
178 Id. at 391.
1
79 Id.
IS0 Id.
181 Id. at 397 (citing Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279, 282 (9th Cir. 1971), which adopted
the reasoning of the Second Circuit in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d
Cir. 1968), which held that false and misleading statements are made in connection with securi-
ties trading "whenever assertions are made ... in a manner reasonably calculated to influence
the investing public").
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tions are similar,' s2 an accounting firm does not have the same re-
sponsibility to investors as an issuer, especially in a public misrep-
resentation context.183  Although accounting firms are indirectly
responsible to stockholders, it does not necessarily follow that the
same analysis should apply to them and to issuers.1
84
C. Semerenko v. Cendant Corp.: Does There Need
to Be a Connection At All?
The Third Circuit essentially nullified the "in connection
with" requirement by adopting an overly broad approach, captur-
ing so much conduct that a defendant corporation would have dif-
ficulty arguing that any conduct was not in connection with a
transaction. In Semerenko, a class of investors appealed the dis-
missal of their claims under section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 and SEC Rule lOb-5.185 The action against the
Cendant Corporation, its former officers and directors, and its ac-
countant alleged that misrepresentations were made during a ten-
der offer for shares of American Bankers Insurance Group, Inc
("ABI"). 18 6  The complaint alleged that these misrepresentations
had caused the class to purchase shares of ABI stock at artificially
inflated prices and that, when the misrepresentations were finally
disclosed to the public and the merger agreement was terminated,
the class suffered a loss in their investment.1
8 7
1. The Court's Reasoning
This case does not exemplify a public misrepresentation by a
corporation since the plaintiffs were purchasers of ABI's stock
rather than Cendant's stock. 188  Cendant initially made a tender
182 Fletcher, supra note 6, at 932 (noting the general judicial rejection of a requirement of
privity between the defendant and the plaintiff).
183 Id. at 942. "The accountant's role as a non-trading speaker is similar to that of the non-
trading corporate issuer involved in category 2, but the former's role is more attenuated than the
latter's, since the alleged misrepresentations made by an accountant do not necessarily go to the
merits of the securities and the accountant does not have the issuer/security nexus present in the
category 2 cases." Id.
184 See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 6, at 942. Professor Fletcher noted that in some misrep-
resentation by accountant cases the intent requirement that many category 2 cases impose is not
required. Id. "hus, an odd situation arises in which the connection appears more attenuated,
but the stringency of the 'in connection with' inquiry is actually lessened." Id. (citing SEC v.
Drysdale Sec. Corp., 785 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986), and Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F. Supp.
879 (E.D. Pa. 1978)). This may, however, cut in favor of using a similar analysis in order to
hold corporate issuers liable for misrepresentations since the attenuation is less.
185 Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 169 (3d Cir. 2000).
186Id.
187 Id.
188 In the public misrepresentation by a corporate issuer context, the plaintiffs generally are
purchasers of stock of the corporation that has issued the misleading statement. See Fletcher,
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offer to purchase ABI stock at $58 per share and then filed a
Schedule 14D-1 that overstated its income during prior financial
periods. 89 When its bid was matched, Cendant raised the bid to
$67 per share and agreed to purchase ABI for $3.1 billion in cash
and stock of Cendant.J90 Cendant reported the terms of the merger
agreement, but later announced that it had discovered accounting
irregularities and explained that the problems occurred within a
single business unit. 19! After the announcement, ABI's stock price
dropped eleven percent, but subsequent press releases maintained
that the merger would be completed. 92  Cendant then announced
that the reduction of its income would be twice what was previ-
ously disclosed, and that the board of directors had decided to re-
state its earnings for 1996 and 1997.193 As a result, ABI's stock
price fell even further. Cendant later filed an amended 10-K for
1997 filed by Cendant, stating that it had actually lost $217.2 mil-
lion, rather than $55.5 million. ABI's stock price declined further.
Finally, Cendant announced that it was terminating the merger
agreement. 194
The Third Circuit held that to satisfy the "in connection with"
requirement of 1Ob-5 in the context of dissemination of misleading
information by a corporation, a plaintiff must show that "the mis-
representations in question were disseminated to the public in a
medium upon which a reasonable investor would rely, and that
they were material when disseminated."1 95 This approach essen-
tially requires only that a statement be public and material.196 The
question of whether the facts satisfied this test was remanded to
the district court. 197 In adopting its approach, the court cited In re
Ames Department Stores Inc. Stock Litigation198 and McGann v.
Ernst & Young 199 for the proposition that the "in connection with"
element can be established by the materiality of the misrepresenta-
supra note 6, at 932 (discussing his category 2 cases under the "in connection with" requirement
where the corporation issues a statement about itself that it knows to be false, and on the basis of
which investors trade that corporation's stock). Indeed, at first glance the connection here
seems rather attenuated.
189 Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 170.
190 Id.
191 ld.192 Id. at 170-7 1.
193 Id. at 171.
1
94 Id.
195 Id. at 176.
196But see Williams, supra note 59, at 608 (stating that Third Circuit distilled the entire
analysis into materiality and reasonableness).
197 Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 177-78 (explaining that the standard so adopted was different
from the one applied by the district court).
198991 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1993).
M9 102 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996).
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tion and the means of its dissemination. 200 However, as the Third
Circuit misconstrued the standards adopted in these cases, Semer-
enko is inappropriately broad.
The court argued that McGann and Ames have adopted the
standard articulated in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.20 1 and there-
fore have applied an objective analysis that considered the alleged
misrepresentation in the context in which it was made.2 °2 This ar-
gument goes on to state that Ames and McGann held that "where
the fraud alleged involves the public dissemination of information
in a medium upon which an investor would presumably rely, the
'in connection with' element may be established by proof of the
materiality of the misrepresentation and the means of dissemina-
tion. ' 2 °3 This statement, however, misconstrues the two cases.
First, Ames cites Texas Gulf Sulphur favorably, yet presumes
that the "in connection with" requirement could be established by
a mere showing of reliance by the investor on whom the fraud was
committed, 1°4 as opposed to false statements made in a manner
reasonably calculated to influence the investing public.20 5 There-
fore, to say that Ames relied on Texas Gulf Sulphur is inaccurate:
Texas Gulf Sulphur did not hold that materiality and the means of
dissemination were required to establish the "in connection with"
requirement. Moreover, the language quoted from Texas Gulf Sul-
phur was describing the entire lOb-5 claim and not the holding
regarding that element. With regard to the "in connection with"
requirement, Texas Gulf Sulphur held that it is satisfied "whenever
assertions are made.., in a manner reasonably calculated to influ-
ence the investing public . . . if such assertions are false or mis-
leading or are so incomplete as to mislead, irrespective of whether
the issuance of the release was motivated by corporate officials for
ulterior purposes.,, 206 Thus, Texas Gulf Sulphur used a "reasonably
calculated" standard, and not a "materiality and means of dissemi-
nation" standard.2 °7
Second, McGann adopted the reasoning of Texas Gulf Sul-
phur, making the argument inaccurate in its statement that the "in
connection with" requirement is satisfied under McGann by proof
200 Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 176.
201401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
202 Semerenko., 223 F.3d at 176.
203 Id.
204 In re Ames Dep't Stores Inc. Stock Litig., 991 F.2d 953, 967 (2d Cir. 1993).
205 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968).
2
06Id.
207 Although Ames argued that materiality and means of dissemination satisfy the Texas
Gulf Sulphur "reasonably calculated" standard, "calculation" would seem to denote a mindset of
some sort.
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of materiality and the means of its dissemination. McGann found
that the requirement was satisfied because the accounting firm
knew that its fraudulent report would be included in its client's
Form 10-K and that the false assertions had therefore been made in
a manner calculated to influence the investing public; materiality
and means of dissemination were not factors in the determina-
tion.2 °8 Therefore, the reliance of Semerenko on these two cases is
misplaced.
2. The Materiality Prong
In holding that the "in connection with" requirement has two
prongs, one requiring that the information be material, Semerenko
added another layer of materiality to the analysis. A lOb-5 action
already requires that the misstatement be material. 2° Semerenko
noted that the district court should decide the issue of materiality
"only if the alleged misrepresentations are so clearly and obviously
unimportant that reasonable minds could not differ in their answers
to the question. 2 °10 The court placed more emphasis on materiality
than is necessary and, in doing so, made it even more difficult for
defendants in lOb-5 actions to argue that the fraud was not ade-
quately connected to a securities transaction. It is hard to imagine
a scenario in which an investor would not claim that the informa-
tion was significant in making her investment decision, especially
ex post. That is, after an investor has lost money on an invest-
ment, if she later learns that false information was disseminated at
the time the securities were purchased, she need only allege that
she considered the information significant in making the invest-
ment decision. A corporation would have a difficult time rebutting
211this allegation, regardless of her actual reliance, since it would
be nearly impossible to prove that a reasonable investor would not
consider such information significant. Indeed, it is hard to imagine
what type of apparently positive information a reasonable investor
would not find significant, given the impulsive nature of invest-
ment decisions as they occur in reality today.
2N McGann v. Ernst & Young, 102 F.3d 390, 397 (9th Cir. 1996).
209HAZEN, supra note 3, § 12.4[2]; see also Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 54, at 6
(noting that the addition of a materiality prong to the "in connection with" requirement analysis
"may be more semantic than substantive because the materiality of the misrepresentation is a
sine qua non of a lOb-5 violation whether it is viewed separately, or as a part of the 'in connec-
tion with' requirement").
210 Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 178 (3d Cir. 2000).
211 From the outset, corporations have difficulty proving that a plaintiff did not rely on the
alleged misrepresentation, since the U.S. Supreme Court found a rebuttable presumption of
reliance based on the fraud on the market theory. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
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Further, Professor Fletcher found that, in using a causation or
materiality standard alone to determine whether the "in connection
with" element is satisfied, courts overlook the difference between
category 1 cases of paradigmatic securities fraud and category 2
cases, where the connection is more attenuated. 2  In paradigmatic
securities fraud cases, "a seller of securities, for the purpose of
inducing another to purchase those securities, deliberately and af-
firmatively misleads the buyer in a matter that would clearly influ-
ence the buyer's investment decision. '21 3 In category 2 cases, a
corporation issues a statement about itself knowing that it is false,
and investors trade on the basis of that information and lose money
when the falsity is revealed. 1 4
Requiring only that the dissemination of misleading informa-
tion be material in order to satisfy the connection between the
fraud and the purchase or sale of a security ignores the difference
between cases where the purchaser or seller committed fraud and
cases where a third party committed fraud. When a corporation
issues a misleading statement, requiring materiality alone assumes
that there exists the same connection as in the paradigmatic securi-
ties fraud cases. 1 5 It should not be assumed that what works in
one type of lOb-5 action should be used in all other factual scenar-
ios. 216 This point is conceded by Semerenko, as it adds an addi-
tional prong, requiring that the information have been dissemi-
nated into a medium in which a reasonable investor would rely.21 7
3. The Public Dissemination Prong
The second prong of an "in connection with" analysis under
Rule lOb-5, according to Semerenko, is whether the misrepresenta-
tions were disseminated to the public in a medium upon which a
reasonable investor would rely.21 8 This prong of the analysis
merely calls for the misrepresentation to be made public.
2
'
9
Semerenko failed to indicate, however, what a reasonable investor
would not rely on, leaving this public dissemination prong ill-
212 Fletcher, supra note 6, at 935.
213 Id. at 929-30.
214 Id. at 932.
215 Id. at 933.
216 Id. at 936.
217 Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 176 (3d Cir. 2000).
2181Id.
219 At least one court has held that the issuance of a press release, coupled with public trad-
ing in the company's stock, satisfies the "in connection with" requirement. SEC v. Rana Re-
search, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1993) (additionally noting that "[firaud touching the
intrinsic value of securities and the means of accomplishing the purchase of securities is suffi-
ciently connected with securities transactions to bring the fraud within section 10(b)" of the
1934 Securities Exchange Act).
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defined and potentially limitless. Even a technical advertisement
in a specialized journal could satisfy the requirement.22' This
prong of the analysis is problematic, even when examined in con-
junction with the materiality prong, because neither poses an ob-
stacle to a plaintiff's satisfaction of the "in connection with" re-
quirement.
To illustrate, a plaintiff could invoke the fraud on the market
theory, which holds that "because the market price of a stock is
determined by all publicly available material information regard-
ing the company and its business, misleading statements defraud
purchasers or sellers of stock even if they do not directly rely on
the misstatements." 222 This theory is based on the efficient market
hypothesis, which posits that financial markets quickly reflect new
public information in stock prices.223 The fraud on the market the-
ory, however, should not be determinative of whether the "in con-
nection with" requirement is satisfied.
To allow this theory to satisfy two very distinct requirements
of lOb-5 (reliance and "in connection with") would be to obliterate
the distinction between the two and overlap them. The Supreme
Court extended the fraud on the market theory to lOb-5 cases in
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson.224 The Supreme Court found that a rebut-
table presumption of reliance, based on the fraud on the market
theory, was consistent with the purposes of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act.225  However, the Court made no comment as to
whether the fraud on the market theory could create a rebuttable
presumption that fraud is "in connection with" the purchase or sale
of securities. This creates an insurmountable presumption of li-
ability based on reliance, when the fraud might not be connected to
2 0 HAZEN, supra note 3, § 12.5[1] (noting that an advertisement in a medical journal pro-
moting a new drug could form the basis of lOb-5 liability (citing In re Carter-Wallace, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 150 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998))). Liability could even extend to a corporation based on a
hyperlink from the company's website to a third party website as a result of the content of the
third party website being imputed to the company when impermissible communications are
made the SEC warned. Jonathan Bick, Avoid the Hyper-Liability of Hyperlinks: From False
Advertising to Copyright Infringement to Problems with the SEC, Web Site Linking Can Be
Dangerous, N.J. L.J., May 6, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Group File, Most Recent Two
Years.
221 See Williams, supra note 59, at 608 (noting that the Third Circuit's approach "virtually
assures that every Rule lOb-5 complaint will meet the 'in connection with' requirement. As-
suming a plaintiff can meet the already relaxed reliance and causation elements, such cases will
almost certainly survive a motion to dismiss").222Muratori, supra note 23, at 1066 (citing Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d
Cir. 1986)).
223 Id. at 1067 n.72 (citing Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities
Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 872 (1988)).
224485 U.S. 224 (1988).
225 Id. at 245.
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the actual transaction, even when it is connected to the ultimate
loss. 2 26 To require that the misleading information have been dis-
seminated into a medium on which a reasonable investor would
rely is to confuse the reliance element with the "in connection
with" requirement. 7
Not all publicly available information influences an invest-
ment decision. It is true that all publicly available information
may affect a particular security, but that, by itself, should not ren-
der corporate issuers liable for every false advertisement or mar-
228keting campaign. By allowing seemingly any public dissemina-
tion to satisfy the "in connection with" requirement, Semerenko
has opened the door for potentially unlimited liability. The re-
quirement will no longer be an obstacle to recovery for plaintiffs.
226 See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1419 n.8 (3d Cir. 1997)
(noting that the fraud on the market theory affords plaintiffs a rebuttable presumption of reliance
if the plaintiffs bought or sold the securities in an efficient market); see also In re Seagate Tech-
nology I1 Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 1341, 1354-55 (N.D. Cal. 1994) ("The essence of the fraud-
on-the-market theory of liability is that a plaintiff seeking to recover under Rule lOb-5 for an
improper corporate dissemination need not prove his own personal reliance on the particular
misrepresentation; instead, reliance is to be presumed."). It should be noted that generally lOb-5
plaintiffs must prove two types of causation, transaction causation and loss causation. Davis,
supra note 3, at 395. Transaction causation requires the plaintiff to show that "but for" the
defendant's fraud, the transaction would not have occurred, or occurred on different terms,
which can be established by proof of reliance. Id. Loss causation generally requires the plain-
tiff to prove that had she known the truth she would not had acted, and in addition, that the fraud
was in some way responsible for her loss. Id.; see also Castellano v. Young & Rubicam, Inc.,
257 F.3d 171, 186 (2d Cir. 2001) ("While transaction causation is generally understood as reli-
ance, loss causation has often been described as proximate cause, meaning that the damages
suffered by Plaintiff must be a foreseeable consequence of any misrepresentation or material
omission."); Suez Equity Investors v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 96 (2d Cir. 2001)
(stating that transaction causation is based on reliance, while loss causation is akin to proximate
cause). This distinction shows that it is possible that a misrepresentation may be connected to a
loss, but it may not be connected to the transaction. If it were connected to the loss, but not the
transaction, then it would be a type of commercial or common law fraud that should not fall
under lOb-5. If it is connected to the loss and the transaction, then it would be foreseeable by
the corporation and the fraud should be within the ambit of lOb-5.22 7
In In re Carter-Wallace, Inc. Securities Litigation, 150 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998), the
fraud on the market theory was utilized to establish the "in connection with" requirement. The
plaintiffs, who purchased shares of Carter-Wallace while ads dealing with antiepileptic drugs
which later caused deaths ran, alleged that the ads were false and misleading. The court noted
that the "in connection with" requirement has been broadly construed, citing Texas Gulf Sulphur
as support. It explained that when a plaintiff bases a claim on the fraud on the market theory, a
straightforward cause and effect test determines whether the requirement is satisfied. Id. at 156.
Technical advertisements in sophisticated medical journals detailing a new drug could be rele-
vant to analysts evaluating the stock of the drug maker. Therefore, a court cannot accurately
conclude that the advertisements would never satisfy the "in connection with" requirement. Id.
Although this reasoning is troublesome because the fraud on the market theory would satisfy
both the reliance element and the "in connection with" requirement at the same time, the court
ultimately came to the correct conclusion: the corporation could have reasonably expected that
an investor's investment decision would be influenced by the advertisement.
228 Of course if a corporation knows that the misleading information may affect its stock
price, it is all the more reason to hold a corporate issuer liable; in that case the corporation has a
reasonable expectation of influencing an investment decision as a result of a change in price.
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In the long run, this can hurt corporations (and consequently inves-
tors) when the costs of litigation and settlement are passed on to
consumers.2
29
III. WHY lOb-5 LIABILITY SHOULD BE LIMITED
Due to the far reaching implications of the Semerenko analy-
sis of the "in connection with" requirement, it is time to adopt the
"reasonable-expectation-of-influencing-an-investment-decision"
test,23° which can be applied consistently to cases of dissemination
of misleading information by a corporation.23 1  Some commenta-
tors believe that a broad approach is necessary to protect investors
from fraud, while others believe that a narrow approach is neces-
232
sary to avoid class action abuses. As a result, corporations may
be uncertain as to what constitutes a lOb-5 violation.2 33  This, in
turn, can affect their behavior, especially with respect to advertis-
ing and disclosures. Moreover, directors may become hesitant to
pursue legitimate opportunities that they otherwise would pursue
had they not been faced with possible liability and a potentially
devastating public relations nightmare. Once an action alleging
securities fraud has been initiated, the damage is done, as stock
prices may plummet due to a loss of investor confidence.
Although Congress intended to protect investors, it did not in-
tend to protect all investor activities. It merely wished to reduce
the risks of dealing in securities by providing a remedy when in-
vestors enter unfair transactions.234 Unfair transactions would pre-
sumably not include those cases where misrepresentations have a
tangential or ancillary connection to securities or to a transaction
in which securities are involved. Therefore, in such a case, a cor-
229 If the "in connection with" requirement is no longer an obstacle, then it would seem that
commercial fraud would violate lOb-5, and though honesty should be encouraged, there are
other more appropriate causes of action to deter wrongdoing that are not associated with the sale
or purchase of securities.
23° See infra notes 262-64 and accompanying text (for a discussion of the reasonable ex-
pectation test that this Note proposes).
231 But see Maloney, supra note 5, at 1181-82 (noting that unlike in situations where there
has been a private misrepresentation, lower courts have generally treated cases of public misrep-
resentations in a consistent manner applying the Texas Gulf Sulphur "reasonably calculated"
standard).232 Muratori, supra note 23, at 1057-58; see also Maloney, supra note 5, at 1172-73 (not-
ing that the majority of cases construe the "in connection with" requirement broadly to ensure
protections of investors, while some commentators endorse a narrow reading to keep the flood-
gates to lOb-5 litigation closed).233 Muratori, supra note 23, at 1058 ("[Pjublic companies face an indiscernible boundary
between what does and does violate the prohibition. The resultant pall cast on corporate behav-
ior adversely affects the capital markets that the rule was designed to protect.").234 Wigder, supra note 56, at 1 86.
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poration should not be held liable.235 Plaintiffs should not be able
to file frivolous actions or strike suits under Rule lOb-5,23 6 as these
suits could lead to the potentially devastating stigma of securities
fraud. Instead, the "in connection with" requirement should be
used to limit actions where the fraud is ancillary to the transaction.
A strike suit is a meritless claim that has little chance of suc-
cess but is brought to harass the defendant and force a settlement
that is greater than what the actual claim may be worth.237 Strike
suits in the context of a dissemination of misleading information
are class action suits brought by investors under section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.238 The plaintiffs typically
argue that the defendant corporation used fraudulent or misleading
statements to induce investors to purchase securities. This is trou-
blesome because the misleading statements may not have been rea-
sonably expected to influence investors to purchase or sell securi-
ties. Due to the wide scope of the 1934 Act, there have been both
potential and actual abuses.239 Corporations fear the stigma that
attaches to such suits because companies rely on investor confi-
dence in the securities market to keep the price of their securities
high. Conceptually, public accusations that the company is en-
gaged in deceptive practices 24° may diminish the value of the cor-
poration's securities. 241 Further, as a company relies on the public
to provide a market for its goods and services, 242 public accusa-
tions may hurt the goodwill and propensity of consumers to return
to the market and purchase future goods and services.243
Strike suits may be filed without evidence of any actual
fraud. 244 Plaintiffs can engage in a fishing expedition that may
cost corporations a considerable amount in out of court costs. As a
result, corporations tend to favor settlements to avoid the pro-
235But see Comment, supra note 38, at 162 (arguing that as a matter of equity, a corpora-
tion should bear the losses of its fraudulent or knowingly misleading public statements).236 Wigder, supra note 56, at 1286.
237 Feinstein, supra note 19, at 864.
238 Catina & Schmitt, supra note 19, at 302.
239 Id.
md.; see also Zelizer, supra note 91, at 27 ("Investors are consumers of a unique com-
modity. Rarely does so much faith and trust go into a purchase. Perhaps naively, investors rely
on a company's reputation... when choosing their investments.").
241 Feinstein, supra note 19, at 865.
2 4 2 Id.
243 See Comment, supra note 38, at 168 (discussing the fact that corporations may pass on
the costs of litigation and damages to innocent consumers of its products and as a result the
corporation will be penalized for the protection of the investing public at the expense of the
larger consuming public, which may not be a desirable result).
244 It should be noted that the heightened pleading requirement of the Reform Act assures
that individual suits brought in federal courts and class actions have adequate facts prior to
discovery. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
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longed stigmatizing effect of a trial and to avoid mounting out-of-
court costs. 245 The potential for abuse under these circumstances is
obvious. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,246 Justice
Rehnquist stated that "[t]here has been widespread recognition that
litigation under Rule lOb-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness dif-
ferent in degree and in kind from that which accompanies litiga-
tion in general." 247  Justice Rehnquist was concerned given that
corporations would rather settle than suffer public relations dam-
age from allegations of fraud, frivolous lawsuits could be filed to
harass corporations and force easy settlements.248
Furthermore, strike suits may hurt investors and markets as
well. Corporations may not disclose information to investors that
they otherwise would have revealed, due to fear of a potential
strike suit based on information that later turns out to be incor-
rect. 249 Therefore investors are unable to make fully informed de-
cisions.
Corporate issuers already can be held liable for a wide array
of conduct under lOb-5, and there is no need to hold them liable
for the dissemination of every misleading statement, especially
when a statement cannot be reasonably expected to influence an
investment decision. 250  For example, unfair exchange ratios lead
to liability under lOb-5, whether in a short-form merger or due to a
misleading proxy statement that fraudulently induced a merger.25'
There, the connection is clear because the corporate issuer influ-
enced an investor to accept an unfair exchange ratio for her shares.
However, a corporation can be held liable under lOb-5 in other
scenarios as well.252 A corporation should not be considered liable
24 5 Catina & Schmitt, supra note 19, at 303.
246421 U.S. 723 (1975) (though not dealing with the issue of connection, it is illustrative
of the potential for abuse).247 Id. at 739.
248 Feinstein, supra note 19, at 864.
249 Catina & Schmitt, supra note 19, at 303-04. Arguably, however, this type of situation
can be handled by the scienter element, since the corporation would not have scienter with re-
spect to a statement which is true at the time. The "in connection with" requirement, as a prin-
ciple of limitation, can supplement this and may make a corporation more willing to disclose.
2° See Comment, supra note 38, at 162-63 (arguing that imposition of total liability for a
statement that is misleading only because of negligence in preparation is undesirable because of
the slight degree of fault and that damages should therefore be apportioned).
25 1Wigder, supra note 56, at 1279 (citing Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d
Cir. 1967) for the short form merger claim and Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 415
F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 1969) for the misleading proxy statement claim).
252See Maloney, supra note 5, at 1174-75 (noting other activities in which a corporation
can be held liable under lOb-5, besides the issuance of misleading information, are a corpora-
tion's silence despite a duty to disclose, tipping, insider trading, and market manipulation); see
also Wigder, supra note 56, at 1278-79 (noting that a claim against a corporate issuer can also
arise under lOb-5 when a corporation issues shares to a controlling shareholder for inadequate
consideration (citing Elfenbeim v. Yeager, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 91,368 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)
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when a public statement that contains misleading information is
ancillary to a securities transaction.
An additional reason to limit lOb-5 liability of corporations in
the public misrepresentation context is that the plaintiff may be
alleging common law fraud involving a breach of fiduciary duty or
commercial fraud.253 The "in connection with" requirement is just
the device to limit the application of lOb-5 in this situation be-
cause the element is precisely what prevents a plaintiff from
falsely linking fraud to a securities transaction. For these reasons,
the "in connection with" requirement should be used to limit ap-
plication of lOb-5 against corporations to instances where the cor-
poration reasonably expected to influence an investor's investment
decision.
Not only should there be concern for the tension between pro-
tecting investors from fraud and corporations from the stigma of
securities fraud associated with claims based on statements that
could not have been reasonably expected to influence an invest-
ment decision, but the integrity of the securities markets and the
trading process also must be protected.254 Although the need to
protect investors, the market, and the trading process necessitates a
broad analysis of the "in connection with" requirement, the need to
protect corporations from the stigma of securities fraud associated
with claims based on insignificant statements requires the applica-
tion of Rule lOb-5 to be limited. This is because negative effects
on corporations conceptually can also harm investors, the market,
and the trading process. Limiting lOb-5 liability by using the "in
connection with" requirement appropriately protects corporations,
while still affording investors the protection they deserve under the
securities laws. Reasonable investors should understand that some
statements are directed to them, whereas other statements, such as
advertisements directed at consumers, are not.255 Therefore, under
the proposed application of the "in connection with" requirement,
and Ruckle v. Roto American Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964))); 14 WILLIAM MEADE
FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 6853 (perm. ed.,
rev. vol. 2003) (noting transactions that may create liability under 0b-5 include "stock options;
tender offers and takeover bids; exchanges of stock in connection with mergers, consolidations
and other reorganizations; issuance by corporation of its own stock; and solicitation of proxies")
(citations omitted).253 Black, supra note 94, at 540.
254 See, e.g., Wigder, supra note 56, at 1282 (noting that in Superintendent of Ins. of NY v.
Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971) it was clear that the public investors and the secu-
rities markets were not harmed and thus the issue was whether the fraud affected the trading
process).
255 See Muratori, supra note 23, at 1082 (noting that fraud in advertising should be the ba-
sis of a fraud in advertising claim brought by consumers, not investors because a reasonable
investor would not rely on it).
1384 [Vol. 54:4
"IN CONNECTION WITH"
investors would be protected to the extent that they should be, but
liability would not be imposed under lOb-5 for claims involving
common law fraud or commercial fraud. An investor would be
able to bring a claim as a consumer, but only to the extent that a
corporation could reasonably expect to influence her investment
decision, should a lOb-5 action lie. 6  Investors are protected by
limiting lOb-5 actions since a corporation is an aggregation of in-
vestor shareholders and any settlement or damages that are paid
out to a set of plaintiffs harms all of a corporation's investors:
257
such a pay-out could lower the value of the corporation and, con-
sequently, lower the value of its securities. Alternatively, the
money could have been paid out in dividends, or even put to an-
other use.
The market and trading process must also be protected from
the dissemination of misleading information by a corporate issuer.
Again, however, this can be accomplished by a limited application
of lOb-5, through an appropriately restricted use of the "in connec-
tion with" requirement. Since reasonable investors should be in-
fluenced by investment-related disclosure documents (and not
other sources of information) when making investment deci-
sions,2 58 limiting the lOb-5 liability of corporations can adequately
protect the market. If the efficient market hypothesis is correct
and all publicly available information is in fact instantly reflected
in the price of stocks, such that, absent fraud, the market price can
be trusted to be the correct price absent fraud,259 those few unrea-
sonable investors who base investment decisions on inappropriate
information will have a negligible effect on the market.260 The
counterargument is that, because analysts may take into account all
256 It should be noted that an investor should be able to sue for damages when she later
finds out that there was a misrepresentation made at the time of the investment decision based
on the reliance element since conceivably a corporation could have expected to influence the
decision and thus satisfy the "in connection with" requirement based on the reasonable expecta-
tion of influencing the investment decision test. See infra notes 262-64 and accompanying text;
see also Safecard Serv., Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., 537 F. Supp. 1137, 1142-43 (E.D. Va. 1982)
("A finding of 'in connection with' where a person sells after knowledge of a fraud would put
him in [a] . .. risk-free situation: if his securities performed less well than he hoped, he could
sue... to raise his yield; or if his securities performed up to expectations... he could refrain
from suit. By contrast, a seller in a non-fraud situation always takes a risk that the performance
of his securities will fall below expectations.").
257 See Comment, supra note 38, at 168 (discussing the fact that the losses caused by a
publicly disseminated misleading release usually far exceed the ability of responsible officers to
pay, and as a result the corporation compensates the victims).258 Muratori, supra note 23, at 1082.
259 Id. at 1067 n.72 (citing Langevoort, supra note 219, at 872)).
260 1d. at 1082 (discussing effect upon investors who rely on advertising for their invest-
ment decisions).
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information in valuing a security 261 and investors may be influ-
enced by non-investment-related disclosures, the consequence is
nonetheless market manipulation that should be prohibited. A
"reasonable expectation" test is necessary because some informa-
tion may influence an investment decision even though it is not an
investment-related disclosure. The integrity of the market and
trading process would be afforded the protection that it requires by
limiting the liability of corporations in situations in which the
fraud has only a tangential connection to the securities or a trans-
action involving securities.
To require a reasonable expectation of influencing the invest-
ment decision on the part of the party that commits the fraud can
serve to limit the lOb-5 actions arising from situations in which
misleading information has been disseminated. To satisfy this test,
a plaintiff would have to show that the defendant corporation ex-
pected that its misrepresentation would influence the investor's
262decision to purchase or sell a security. Thus, whether the secu-
rity itself was affected by the misrepresentation and whether the
misrepresentation directly concerned the security would be irrele-
vant to whether the "in connection with" requirement is met.263
This approach changes the focus from such factors as materiality,
261 As a matter of policy, it may be better that corporations are not held liable under 1Ob-5
for forecasts and statements of analysts that take into account information that the corporation
disseminates unless the corporation adopts or accepts them because it may require the corpora-
tion to police the analysts and specifically reject the forecasts. See, e.g., In re Navarre Corp.
Sec. Litig., 299 F.3d 735, 743 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting that generally corporate issuers are not
liable for statements by analysts unless they have done something to render the forecasts attrib-
utable to the issuers).
262 Although this test sounds similar to the Texas Gulf Sulphur "reasonably calculated"
test, it places more emphasis on the mindset of the corporate issuer defendant. The Texas Gulf
Sulphur standard may, as it has been interpreted in some cases, place the emphasis on the mate-
riality and the means of dissemination, a standard which this Note argued is too broad in Part
II.C. See SEC v. Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that materiality
and means of dissemination standard for the "in connection with" requirement developed from
the Texas Gulf Sulphur "reasonably calculated" standard).
263 Using a reasonable expectation test for all public misrepresentations by corporate issu-
ers leads to predictability as to when the fraud is in connection with the securities transaction.
By contrast, Williams divides the "in connection with" analysis into two categories, "classic
genre" and "atypical." Williams, supra note 59, at 609-10. He argues that for "classic genre"
cases, where the misrepresentation directly relates to the security involved, the more liberal
materiality and dissemination standard should apply. Id. In the "atypical" cases, where the
misrepresentation does not directly relate to the security at issue, he argues for a case by case
approach. Id. This would be difficult for corporations to apply ex ante, especially with respect
to marketing and advertising campaigns. Often ads will contain puffimg, and marketers should
not be burdened with this analysis before undertaking a marketing plan. A reasonable expecta-
tion test, though not a bright line rule, would provide more guidance to what would constitute a
violation of lOb-5. See S. REP. No. 73-792, at 6 (1934) (stating that regulation requires clear
statutory provisions). The "classic genre"/"atypical" distinction would be of no use to corporate
planners, who are the ones in the position to prevent the misrepresentation from being made
public.
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reliance, causation and scienter with respect to the fraud, and in-
stead focuses on the defendant's expectation with respect to influ-
encing the investment activity. Though this invokes what looks
like a causation inquiry, it would actually allow investors to argue
that the causation element is satisfied because the fraud caused the
subsequent transaction; 264 but it would also allow for the defendant
corporation to argue that the "in connection with" requirement is
not satisfied because it did not expect that the misrepresentation
would influence the investor. Thus, both sides can make argu-
ments in a lOb-5 action and corporations would no longer be sub-
ject to what amounts to a de minimis test for the "in connection
with" requirement.
CONCLUSION
The "in connection with" requirement of SEC Rule lOb-5 is
an independent element, and courts should not mix it with other
elements of a cause of action. Materiality is already required and
public dissemination into a medium in which an investor may rely
poses no bar for plaintiffs to overcome. Legislative intent with
respect to section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, analysis of major case law
precedent, and recent trends in securities legislation point to a
more limited application of lOb-5 in public misrepresentation
cases. The impact of a lOb-5 action against a corporation, espe-
cially in light of the recent and tremendous distrust for the corpo-
rate world, can be devastating to a corporation. The federal cir-
cuits have interpreted the requirement in an inconsistent fashion.
A broad-but not overly broad-approach works best in the con-
text of a public misrepresentation by a corporation to protect in-
vestors, as a narrow approach may not capture conduct that should
be actionable. The best way to limit frivolous actions is to pre-
clude liability when a misrepresentation is not connected to a secu-
rities transaction. The vehicle with which to accomplish this in a
lOb-5 action is the "in connection with" requirement. Therefore,
while protection of investors dictates a broad approach, courts
should look to the "in connection with" requirement as a principle
of limitation.
264A plaintiff could argue that there was transaction causation, analyzed separately from
the "in connection with" requirement. See supra note 226.
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